This paper attempts to empirically identify the key factors involved in the decision to scrap a wind turbine in Denmark. I use a data set that consists of all wind turbines installed and scrapped in Denmark as well as data on scrapping certificates and electricity prices in the Nordic Electricity Market. Factors such as operating losses and repair versus replacement costs which are most often cited in the economics litterature, have at best a modest role. Instead the importance of the opportunity cost of operating an older wind turbine on valuable wind-rich land is shown to be a prominent factor in the decision to scrap. I use descriptive analysis to show the strong effect that renewable energy policy plays in the decision to scrap a turbine. Through use of both non-parametric and semi-parametric duration models and an instrumental variables approach I identify a strong effect for scrapping schemes put in place by the Danish government. I also obtain the, initially counterintuitive result that, more effective wind turbines have a higher hazard of being scrapped. The results have implications for energy policy design Email address: johannes.mauritzen@nhh.no (Johannes Mauritzen)
Introduction
The decision of whether to abandon or scrap a productive good is a fundamental issue in economics. In this paper, I empirically analyze the factors that determine the decision to scrap wind turbines in Denmark. I argue that the scrapping decision for wind turbines is a special case, but it is an important special case. In 2009, 37 gigawatts of wind power capacity was installed world wide -the equivalent of 37 large nuclear power plants. Furthermore, huge amounts of wind power investment is being planned from Great Britain to China. The special characteristics of the scrapping decision for wind turbines and its implications for investment are important for policy makers, investors, and system operators. Denmark is particularily well suited as a case study for the simple reason that it is one of the few places with a sufficient history of significant wind power investment.
The traditional economics litterature on the scrapping of durable productive goods tends to focus on marginal and average running costs, and relatively more recently price and cost uncertainty of outputs and inputs (?) . Studies of vehicle scrappings, a particularily popular subject, tend to focus on repair and replacement costs and issues of depcreciation. But several factors make wind turbines a special case:
• Very low marginal operating cost • Importance of geographic placement • High rate of technological change • High level of government involvement in output price setting and subsidies The low, almost negligent marginal operating costs of wind turbines means that once the turbine is built, the real operating margin is nearly always positive. It is highly unlikely that a real operating loss for the turbine could be the direct reason for a scrapping. Another potential reason for scrapping is a combination of technical failure and the relative magnitude of reparation and replacement costs.
Yet technical failure plays only a minor role in the scrappage decision of wind turbines.
Instead, this paper will show that the dominant reason for scrapping a wind turbine is the opportunity cost that results from a combination of scarce land resources and a high rate of technological change. An older turbine operating on a windrich piece of land means that one can not put in its place a newer, larger and more efficient turbine in its place. Scarce land resources is an especially important consideration for wind turbines since the total energy yield is highly dependent on average wind speeds 1 . Other factors may also play a role in making land suited for wind turbines especially scarce, such as grid infrastructure, zoning rules, and environmental concerns.
Opportunity costs are often necessarily difficult to capture empirically. However, in Denmark, the government has had a significant role in setting the tariff for electricity from wind power (and other sources) and tariff policy has shifted abruptly several time over the course of the period studied, as shown in figure 1. The tariffs and subsidies are set up such that a turbine installed under a certain period will receive that tariff over a defined lifetime. The shift in tariff policy then creates a sharp discontinuity in the opportunity cost. A decrease in tariffs at a certain date, for instance, means that a turbine installed just before and after this date can have 1 A simplified energy conversion formula for wind power is E = 1/2ΦAtv 3 where A is the sweeping area of the blades and v is the average wind velocity. Thus energy output from a wind turbine increases approximately cubically with average wind speed The Danish government also launched several schemes aimed at directly encouraging the scrapping of older turbines. To test the effects that these schemes as well as other factors had on scrappage rates, I use both non-parametric and semiparametric duration models. The main reason for using such models, alternatively called survival or time-to-failure models is the issue of censoring. Only a third of the turbines in my data set were scrapped over the period studied. These censored observations would cause biased estimators using simpler logit or linear-probability models. However, the effect of censoring is accounted for with the duration models I use. In section 3 I give a brief overview of duration models.
My main data set consists of all 6754 turbines constructed in Denmark between 1977 and February 2011. 2279 of the turbines were scrapped before February of 2011. The data set includes variables for turbine capacity, height, rotor diameter, coordinates and principality of installation. Date of installation, and if applicable, date of scrappage are also noted, as is the yearly amount of energy produced from each turbine. The full data set is publicly available on the website of the Danish state electricity grid company, energinet (http://www.energinett.dk).
I identify the effects of the scrappage policies by using the policies cut-off points for turbine capacity as instruments. I find evidence for a large and significant effect for both the scrapping schemes, this despite the disappointment expressed by the government itself at the effectiveness of the schemes (?). The initial scrappage schemes covering turbines under 150 kW is estimated to roughly double the hazard of scrappage. The estimated effectiveness for the second policy covering turbines under 450 kW, is more uncertain, but is nonetheless large and significant -likely increasing the hazard of scrapping by a factor of between 3 and 10.
Using the data available on energy produced per turbine, I create an index of efficiency where turbine capacity is divided out. Including this term in the semiparametric estimation leads to the finding that more effective turbines have a higher hazard of being scrapped. This finding, while initially surprising, can be explained by the importance of opportunity cost in the decision to scrap. The reason for a turbines relative effectiveness, when capacity is taken into account, is the wind conditions at the site of the turbine. While a turbine placed at a windrich site produces more energy, it also has a higher opportunity cost associated with it.
To my knowledge, this is the first empirical economic analysis of wind turbine scrapping. An overview of the theory of exit and scrapping decisions under uncertainty is covered in chapter seven of ?. A relatively large empirical litterature exists on the scrappage of vehicles. ? looked at the decision to scrap an auto-mobile. He used a data set of cars in Israel to show that vehicle scrappage rates between years 3 and 14 had much more to do with depreciation of the vehicle rather than directly due to failure proneness. He uses his results to explain why cars in Israel, which have high prices due to taxes, tend to have a high life time.
An earlier paper, ? makes a similar econometric argument. ? looks at the costs and benefits of automobile scrappage programs implemented in order to reduce air pollution and ? looks at the determinants of participation in such programs.
A growing litterature on wind power investment and wind power subsidies also exists. ? analyzes the driving forces of wind power capacity development in Denmark. The author calculates a net internal rate of return for various vintages of turbines, and estimates how this effects capacity development. Not surprisingly the author finds a strong correlation. ? gives a general overview and analysis of Danish wind power policy and tries to identify the causes for the "recession" in danish wind turbine expansion between 2002 and 2008. Though the authors note the significant role of policy, they also point towards issues in spatial planning and risk aversion of investors.
Wind and Energy Policy in Denmark
The energy crisis of the 1970's exposed the vulnerabilities of having a power system that was highly dependent on imported fossil fuels, as was the case in Denmark.
Already in 1974 a Danish government commission issued a report asserting that it would be possible to generate 10% of Denmark's electricity needs by wind without causing problems for the grid (?). Even before the energy crisis struck, Denmark had accumulated some experience and knowledge in feeding wind power into the electricity grid, the only country to have succesfully done so at that time. However this was done exclusively with small, experimental turbines in the 50-60 kW range. Clearly, turbine owners who installed after 2002 faced higher price uncertainty and, initially, considerably lower tariffs.
The government also introduced several "scrapping" schemes in order to expand wind power and "[decommission] older and less appropriately sited wind turbines" (?). The rationale likely also involved encouraging wind turbine owners to give up the generous subsidies they received from the existing turbine. The first such scheme was introduced in April of 2001 and lasted through January 1st, 2004. It was also made retroactive to cover turbines that had been scrapped after 1999.
Under this scheme, wind power producers that scrapped a turbine with a rated capacity of less than 150 kW would receive a certificate. This certificate entitles the producer to a subsidy of DKK .17 / kWh (in addition to the regular tariff and subsidy) for a newly built turbine. For scrapped turbines under 100 kW, the extra subsidy was provided for up to 3 times the scrapped capacity. For turbines between 100 and 150, the subsidy could be applied to twice the scrapped capacity. Wind power producers were free to apply several scrapping certificates to a single new turbine. In addition, some producers chose to split the certificates and apply them to several new turbines -for example a scrapped 150 kW turbine can be made into two 75 kW certificates to be applied to two new turbines.
Other aspects of government support for wind power in Denmark include favorable tax treatment and substantial direct research and development funding -notably the RisøNational Lab for Sustainable Energy. Policies have also been put in place to gain acceptance of turbines in the local communities they are placed. This includes "loss of value" rules, which provides compensation for loss of property value, the right for the local population to purchase up to 20% of a new project and subsidies to help municpalities improve scenic areas near new turbines (?).
An environmental economist can admire the effort to put the coase theorem in to action.
The result of all these incentives was a remarkable growth in installed wind capacity as well as often home-grown development of larger, more efficient turbines. The size (in terms of power capacity) is one easily available measure of this rapid technological improvement (figure 3). However, just as important have been advances in manufacturing efficiency and engineering quality that have brought down both capital and maintenance costs.
Models and Methodology
With survival analysis the goal is to identify the shape of a survival function, haz- 
While Kaplan-Meier estimates have the advantage of not requiring any assumptions about the shape of the hazard function, it is also limited in what information it can provide. Only a general shape can be estimated, without the ability of estimating effects beyond estimating in subsamples. On the other end of the spectrum are parametric models, where a general shape for the hazard is assumed and parameters estimated. This approach gives flexibility in the ability to account for effects as well as estimate an explicit hazard function. However, since I do not have any strong a priori assumptions about the shape of the hazard function, a more flexible approach is desirable.
The Cox regression model is referred to as semi-parametric in that it allows for the estimation of factors that are constrained to shifting the hazard function proportionally up or down. However, the shape of the "baseline" hazard itself is obtained non-parametrically by way of a partial likelihood estimation as shown in 2 (?). At each of the k observed failure times and for a vector x j of variables a likelihood is calculated, where R j is the set of subjects that are at risk of failure.
Though much of the economics litterature has tended to use parametric models instead of the cox model, there does not appear to be good justification for this.
Parametric models are only slightly more efficient than the Cox model when the baseline hazard is correctly specified and much less efficient when it is not (?).
Results

Effect of Tariff Policy on Scrappings
As discussed in the introduction, the opportunity cost of operating an older turbine on valuable, wind-rich land is a major determinant of whether and when to scrap. rate that is on average lower. It follows then that the total asset value of that new turbine over its life shifts quite dramatically depending on whether it is installed before or after that date. In turn, the opportunity cost of operating an old turbine on optimal land also shifts, leading to the spike in scrappings. It is rear to have such a clear visual of an opportunity cost. The identifying assumption is that the relatively small difference in capacities will not in themselves have a large effect on the scrappings and significant differences observed in the survival function will be due to the policy. 
Cox Regression Model and the Determinants of Scrappage
In this section I want to analyze the effect of scrappage policy along with other determinants of the hazard of scrappage. In order to do this I use the Cox regression model. As explained earlier, the advantage of this model is that I do not need to make any assumptions about the actual shape of the hazard function.
However, the validity of the estimated coefficients is based on the assumption that the factors shift the overall hazard function proportionally.
I include several turbine-specific variables in the regression. I include the rated power capacity of the turbine as well as a squared term to capture any potential quadratic relationship. In addition I include the two policy dummies of turbines under 150 kW and under 450 kW. These then represent "jumps" in the hazard that are not accounted for by the inclusion of the capacity variable and which can then be explained by the effect of policy.
Significant spatial and geographic data is available in my data set including coordinates and principality. But for simplicitity of interpretation and a wish not to over-parameterize the model, I have chosen to limit explicit spatial data to a east/west dummy, representing the east and west price areas. This dummy variable could capture many elements that differ between the two areas of Denmark.
Referring back to figure 1, market prices for the two areas differs slightly. Factors such as wind-conditions, land value and population density could also be reflected in this variable.
I run regressions both with and without a variable that indicates the year of installation. The inclusion of this variable should not be taken to represent the age of the turbine -the age of the turbine is already controlled for in the model.
Instead it can be read as a latent variable for turbine-specific factors that changed over time and are not otherwise accounted for. For example, this could represent Finally I create a variable meant to represent the overall efficiency of a turbine. I define the variable as in 3. I take the average yearly energy yield (calculated by using only every full year of operation) from each turbine and divide it by the rated capacity. This then captures factors that effect the energy production of a turbine given the capacity of the turbine. The most prominent such factor is likely the average wind speed at the location of the turbine. Given that this assumption is true, the efficiency variable then mainly represents the appropriateness of the land where the turbine is situated. A dot plot of the efficiency indicator is presented in figure ? ? and gives a sense of the mean and spread of the indicator.
The Cox regression model can then be written as in 4. H(t i ) represents the indi-vidual turbine hazards as a function of turbine lifetime. H 0 represents the baseline hazard, which is non-parametrically estimated. X represents the vector of variables, discussed above, that shift the baseline hazard up or down proportionally.
In table 2 I report the results in terms of hazard ratios -the exponent of the estimated β's. The hazard ratios can be interpreted as the proportional effect that a one-unit change in the variable has on the baseline hazard function. The null-hypothesis for the estimated hazard ratios is then that they are equal to one (have no proportional effect on the hazard function). An estimated hazard ratio of 2, for example, would indicate that a one-unit increase in the variable would double the hazard of scrappage. Considering first the policy variables under150 and under450, the regressions indi-cate that the initial scrappage policy increased the chance of scrappage by a factor of approximately two. The large standard error on the under450 policy variable makes any point-estimate quite uncertain. It is clear however, that the policy was effective, likely leading to a 2-to 7-fold increase in the hazard of scrapping and possibly higher.
In the regression where installation year is left out the estimated hazard ratio for turbine capacity, in 100 kW units, is not significantly different from one. However when installation year is controlled for, the hazard ratio becomes highly significant, indicating that each 100 kW increase in capacity leads to a 25% 1 .80 reduction in the hazard of scrappage. This is the expected result. A larger capacity turbine produces more energy and has a higher asset value. The cost of scrapping, in the form of forgone revenues, are then higher for larger turbines.
As figure 3 showed, installation year and capacity size are clearly correlated. Given that installation year also effects the hazard rate, the exclusion of this variable biased the capacity hazard ratio towards one in the initial regression. When it is included, its own estimated hazard ratio indicates that turbines built in later years had a 6% greater chance of being scrapped per year.
The most likely explanation for this coefficient, is that it is indirectly capturing the effect of policy change. Since the first policy change did not happen until 2000, and the vast majority of turbines built since then are censored, it is not the direct effect of the tariff-change that is being captured. Instead, it is reflecting the effect that the policy change had on the opportunity cost of operating an older turbine, as discussed in section 4.1. Anticipation of a policy change to lower tariffs lead to an abrupt jump in scrappings of lower-rated capacity turbines in 2002. Table 3 shows that the effect of a policy change in '02 affected the scrappage of turbines installed in the decade between 1977 and 1987 relatively evenly. The newer turbines therefor experienced, on average, a lower average lifetime than those built earlier. It follows that the estimated hazard ratio for build-year is significantly above one. likely has little to do with the mechanical quality of the turbine 3 Instead it likely reflects the wind resources of the location the turbine is placed in.
From a theoretical stand point, the effect that better wind resources has on the hazard of scrapping is ambiguous. A wind turbine operating in an area with better wind resources produces more energy and has a higher asset value, thus increasing the cost of scrappage in terms of foregone revenue and thus reducing the hazard.
However, it also has a higher opportunity cost that comes from the possibility of installling a newer, larger turbine in its place. The relative magnitude of these effects is dependent on the rate of technological change. The regression results indicates that the effect of the larger opportunity costs is dominant and indicating a high rate of technological change.
Finally, the regression indicates that a turbine built in the western part of the country runs a 50% higher chance of being scrapped than a turbine built in the eastern part of the country. Several reasons could exist for this result. A large majority (nearly 80%) of turbines were built in western Denmark, though this has perhaps most to do with the fact that western Denmark is substantially larger and less densely populated. It may be that the wind-resources in western Denmark are higher, thus the increased hazard reflects the same opportunity cost of land as explained above.
Some care should be taken in interpreting the above hazard ratios, as it is likely that the proportional hazards assumption is violated for some of the variables.
A simple way to check the proportional hazards assumption for each explanatory variable is to run the Cox regression with an added interaction term of the vari-able of interest and time, as in 5. If the proportional hazards model is satisfied, then the effect of the covariates should not vary with time in ways that are not already parameterized (?). A violation of the proportional hazards model does not necessarily mean that the entire regression results are invalid, it does however imply that the estimates could be biased. kW turbine has approximately 4 to 7 times higher hazard after 10 years.
Discussion and Conclusion
The findings in this paper have implications for both energy policy design and wind energy investment. The expected lifetime of a wind turbine is an important consideration in the investment decision. This paper shows that this lifetime is not just a function of the mechanical quality of the turbine, but instead highly dependent on the opportunity cost that arises from an interaction of technological change, land scarcity and electricity prices. Since these factors are in themselves ex-ante uncertain, the expected lifetime of a turbine (and potentially other energy investments) must be seen as inherently uncertain to a greater degree than is recognized in the litterature. From a real options perspective, this uncertainty could be seen to have an adverse affect on investment.
In relation to opportunity cost, changes in government policy are shown to have a strong direct and indirect effects on scrappage rates. Anticipation of tariff reductions for wind power led to large jumps in scrappage rates. This was especially true in the months leading up to the shift to market-based tariffs in 2003. One interesting result that follows from the importance of opportunity costs is that, controlling for turbine-capacity, more efficient turbines have a higher hazard of being scrapped. This is due to the fact that the efficiency metric I use (average yearly energy produced per rated kW of capacity) is capturing, in large part, the wind resources of a turbine's placement.
The scrappage schemes designed to directly encourage the scrapping of older turbines in favor of newer, more advanced turbines are also shown to be highly effective. While the reports on the scheme from the Danish Energy Directorate do not explicitly say so, it is likely that a part of the rationale for the scrappage scheme was to wean producers off of the generous pre-2000 tariff scheme.
Wind power policy in Denmark then serves as an interesting case study in ex-ante and ex-post optimal energy policy. A case can be made ex-ante for a generous wind power subsidy on several grounds -reduction in air pollution, energy generation diversification, technological spill-overs etc. Instituting these policies in the form of guaranteed prices over a defined life-time may also be ex-ante optimal since this removes uncertainty that in itself may delay or reduce investment (?).
Yet there is a time-inconsistency problem. From the point of the view of the policy maker, once the investments have been made, the technology developed, and wind power a significant contributor of energy, the generous subsidy is no longer optimal. Denmark, as in other countries with renewable energy subsidies, lowered subsidies for newer installations as capacity grew. Yet, existing turbines continued to recieve the older, more generous subsidy. This, in effect, reduces the incentive to scrap their existing turbine in favor of a newer, more efficient turbine.
The scrapping incentive is then an attempt at fixing this unintended consequence.
